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Abstract. Constructing a constellation of thirty-six ORBCOMM LEO digital communications satellites mandates an
approach to manufacturing and testing significantly different from other small satellite programs. Schedule
constraints forced overlap of development, qualification. and early production phases, and a production rate of four
spacecraft per month. To avoid problems that could affect a large number of spacecraft, the progam included a
carefully designed flow of functional and environmental testing on development units and spacecraft, in addition to
classical unit and system qualification programs. Although ORBCOMM's complex communications payload was
particularly vulnerable to system problems, few emerged because of the thorough unit development effort. In
addition, the first four spacecraft served as pre-production models to solidify processes, facilities, GSE, test tools,
and documentation to a level far beyond that required for conventional programs. The production process moves the
spacecraft through a number of specialty integration and test areas, while the functional test teams retain overall
responsiblity for individual spacecraft. Early difficulties with unit deliveries and test processes have been overcome,
and production is proceeding smoothly. Twelve spacecraft are currently in systems integration and test, with
eighteen planned for delivery to the launch site this year.
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Introduction
The ORBCOMM system (Figure 1) provides two-way
digital communications via hand-held user terminals
called Subscriber Communicators, a constellation of
satellites in low earth orbit, and a series of ground
stations called Gateway Earthstations. This document
concentrates on production challenges encountered

during the manufacturing of the space-based portion of
the ORBCOMM system.
Currently, two initial
spacecraft are in operation.
The completed
ORBCOMM Constellation will consist of thirty-six
digital communications satellites.

Figure 1: ORHCOMM System

Besides the basic structure and mechanisms, each
spacecraft (Figure 2) consists of several major
subsystems: power, attitude control, and RF
communications.
The electrical power subsystem
comprises batteries, solar arrays, various sensors and
heaters, and a battery charge regulator. The attitude
control subsystem consists of three magnetic torquers, a
nitrogen tank and thrusters, along with several
sophisticated sensors. The RF communications system

comprises three subsystems. The UHF subsystem acts
as a beacon and consists of a transmitter and an antenna.
The Subscriber and Gateway subsystems each contain
an antenna, filters, a transmitter, and a receiver. Many
of the components were contracted to outside vendors,
but Orbital built most of the bus electronics, the
Subscriber Receiver, antenna assembly and certain
other equipment.
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Figure 2: ORBCOMM Spacecraft Deployed Configuration

The market-driven schedule required the program to
produce on-orbit, functional spacecraft in a short time.
The quantity of spacecraft required presented unique
planning challenges. Thirty-four reliable spacecraft
were too numerous for a small development approach
and too few to set up a full production line. The
situation required a hybrid method that bridged the two
approaches. The ORBCOMM program also had to
rapidly transition from engineering development to a
production rate of nearly four spacecraft per month.
Rather than follow a typical development-qualificationproduction sequence, the schedule constraints required
the program to overlap its phases. Instead of the full
barrage of environmental and functional tests, the test
program was tailored to get the maximum utility from
the time spent testing. These techniques entailed both
technical and schedule risk. Because of this, the
program incorporated precautionary tactics to avoid
technical problems that could adversely affect a large
number of flight units or spacecraft. ORBCOMM's
complex communications payload was particularly
vulnerable to system problems.
However, we
encountered very few problems requiring major rework
or causing major schedule slips because of the thorough
unit development effort.

System Production Overview

The spacecraft system production flow comprises
integration, functional testing, and environmental
testing. Preprocessing of the spacecraft structures
incorporates many small items, the propulsion
subsystem, and critical alignments. The structures
proceed to the unit integration phase.
Although
cramped, the mechanical integration process is
straightforward. The installation of most units or
subsystems occurs in less than two weeks at the start of
the flow. Delayed unit production schedules forced the
addition of a few items during functional testing, but
ORBCOMM's flat configuration allowed straightforward access to connectors and mechanical fasteners
at most points in the process.
The subsequent functional and environmental test flow
is much like a traditional program for the initial several
spacecraft. However, test durations and the type of
environmental and functional tests required decreased
as the program progressed. In addition, functional tests
were highly automated to minimize human error and
reduce test time. After eliminating design flaws and
refining the manufacturing processes, the resultant test
flow was efficient and lean.
3
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The spacecraft honeycomb structure is the first
hardware required. The structure preparation task
consists of adding thermal surface coatings, setting up
and match drilling for critical alignments, bonding on
brackets, and installing the nitrogen tank and thrusters
that comprise the reaction control subsystem. The
prepared structure then goes to the system mechanical
integration team for installation of electronic units and
harnessing.

electromagnetic interference, and critical clearance and
deployment checks. In addition to these standard tests
each ORBCOMM spacecraft undergoes a magnetic
calibration procedure that is essential to the proper
functioning of the attitude control system.
As additional spacecraft complete their mechanical integration and start environmental testing, environmental
tests were either decreased in duration or eliminated
altogether.
This reduction was predicated on a
minimum number of previous spacecraft completing the
same test successfully. By the time the final sets of
spacecraft go through environmental testing, the test
sequence will have become very short and efticient.
This sequence will include functional testing along with
a vibration test to verify workmanship, the required
magnetic calibration, and the electromagnetic
interference test to verify EMI close-out workmanship
of each spacecraft. The final functional test includes a
verification of the final flight software load. Other LEO
constellations have taken a similar approach to testing. l
&
2
Following successful completion of the test
sequence, each spacecraft will go to storage to await
shipment to the launch site.

Because of the physical requirements of the stowed
communications antenna, a large portion of the
spacecraft's volume was reserved for the antenna
"trough". This necessitated crowding the other units
into a small area. However, careful placement used the
allowable space efficiently. Units can be installed in
almost any order, though in some cases physical
limitations, unit availability, and the system
functionality needed for certain tests dictated the
preferred order of build-up. For example, the power
system is key to system testing and requires a complete
check out prior to hooking up any other units in order to
minimize the risk of damaging flight units. After
installation of the power system units and the power
harness, the attitude control units and the
communication system units follow as schedule and
physical access allow. As unit production crept ahead
of system production on later spacecraft, most of the
integration was done, as preferred, before any testing.

Production Planning and the Development Program
Two items were critical to the timely execution of the
program.
First we needed a detailed plan that
accommodated all the complex operations on multiple
spacecraft. To fit the schedule goal, a conventional
flow, with tasks in series, was obviously not be
sufficient. Second, any such plan would be ruined if
development problems lingered into production, or unit
flaws repeatedly emerged at the system level. Even
without major difficulties, one of the keys to
ORBCOMM's success was a swift and successful
transition from development to production.

Following mechanical integration, the spacecraft
undergoes functional testing. Testing of the power
subsystem can start when the installation for the power
system components is complete. The remaining bus
tests, including attitude control, flight computer, and
GPS testing, follow power subsystem testing to undergo
The communications systems are tested last. This is
both because certain RF units were typically available
last and because initially the complicated nature of the
RF tests required additional time and refinement.
Extensive use of automated test software and scripts
made the functional tests fast, repeatable, and codified
the detailed knowledge that would otherwise have
required experts to run many of the tests. To do this,
the test environment made extensive use of the on-orbit
telemetry and command package, OASIS, and the
National Instruments LabView test software.

To create a baseline schedule, all the cognizant
engineers provided inputs on the duration of each task.
Each engineer calculated the "most probable" duration
for his or her tasks, including time for modest
contingency operations. (These estimates excluded time
for major anomalies but did include allocations for
typical difficulties.) These durations were compiled
into a task flow for each spacecraft. The task order took
into account critical dependencies and the spacecraft
configuration. We sought to minimize configuration
changes to the spacecraft, both to save time and to
reduce handling and the risk of damaging the hardware.
Because of the complexity of the system and the size of
the program team that we could reasonably assemble
during the startup phase, we initially assumed that the

After initial functional tests, the spacecraft undergo
environmental tests. The first few spacecraft (including
the development and qualification vehicles) see all of
the major environmental tests usually associated with a
production spacecraft program. These tests include
shock, vibration, thermal balance, thermal vacuum,
thermal cycle, electromagnetic compatibility and
4
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maximum number of spacecraft we could effectively
work on at anyone time was four. We later increased
the number of spacecraft being functionally tested to
five, based on our experience with the actual testing and
people available.
(The Specialty Team Approach
section will describe this in more detail.) After laying
out a nominal schedule with all major production phases
in series, we designed a more compact process.

through a conventional thermal-vacuum test, but this
was considered unlikely to result in unit design changes.
Earlier transmitter and antenna vacuum tests had
eliminated the thermal and multipactor risks from these
critical assemblies, and the EDU test had checked for
obvious system problems over temperature.
By using the prototype "flatsats" for software and test
development, and the EDU for test refinement and
selected environmental tests, the development process
stayed ahead of the qualification program. When the
test program found a design flaw or needed hardware
change, we immediately implemented the change in the
qualification hardware. This caused some rework to the
qualification hardware.
However, because the
development program requirements were so stringent
and the early development work was complete before
the start of the qualification program, only a few of
these changes occurred.

First, the program enjoyed a large number of flight and
non-flight spacecraft assets for development and flight
(Table A.). This allowed the qualification program to
start before of the development program was complete.
The development hardware test requirements were as
severe as those for the qualification hardware, but the
testing flow differed to target first those tests most
likely to stress the design. For example, the engineering
development unit (EDU) spacecraft was extensively
functionally tested over temperature, but only a couple
cycles were run. The qualification spacecraft went

Table A: ORBCOMM Satellites and Development Hardware

,Sp.a~ft

4'1&;'\);

'Ii»];;., ',,' ,:,'~::,

Flat Sat #1
Flat Sat #2
Engineering Development Unit
(EDU)
Qualification Vehicle
Flight Models 1&2 (FMl,
FM2)
Flight Models 3-36 (FM3 ... )

7
" ·~'Q'$i.,j·i::i~}.'\'d(.; .;""7 ,"w,
Test script development and
Controller cards harnessed together for
simulation development
software development
Software and test development
Controller cards and partial
communication capable platform
Functional and environmental
Complete and fully functional
pathfinder
spacecraft; preliminary units
Qualification
environmental testing
Complete spacecraft; qualification units
Initial operations. Also used for onFirst two operating spacecraft, launched
orbit test development and testing of
April 3, 1995.
ACS upgrades.
Launch 1997-8; full earth coverage
'Constellation' flight spacecraft

" 'no

',' ,'/~' _IjH~~~Ht~\\)t\,

.,',' ,{".4Y" , : ;ii.F·"~:,j

During the development of the FMl&2 spacecraft,
which are currently in service, the team compiled many
recommendations and "lessons learned" for the present
program.) Many of these design changes and process
improvements are incorporated in the construction of
the FM3-36 spacecraft, reducing the risks that would
normally be encountered. Some of these improvements
were aimed at consistency in production. For example,
the "flat-flex" printed-circuit harness eliminated most
potential wiring errors and created a repeatable barrier

'eCC:

F"

against self-generated receIve band EMI, a bane of
sensitive VHF-band spacecraft. Software and
procedures
also
incorporated
many
of the
recommendations from the initial spacecraft effort. The
development program structure ensured that these
critical functions and trouble areas identified during the
production of the FMl&2 spacecraft were emphasized
early.
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early production from achieving much benefit. Both
units eventually overcame their problems and then
caught up rapidly in production. Fortunately, the
spacecraft could be completely integrated and the bus
subsystems tested before these units were required, We
repeatedly modified the production plan to start
spacecraft into the flow when the gateway transceivers
could be installed. For FM 13 and up, the loading of the
test stations and personnel determines when spacecraft
start into the test flow.

Unit development and qualification programs were
structured similarly to the system one. Two or three
engineering units, usually of high fidelity, were built for
most of the more complex unit types or subsystems, All
design changes were fully qualified. Engineering units
were then incorporated in the EDU spacecraft or
"flatsats"; qual units comprised the qualification
spacecraft. Unit production included full conventional
testing, but used protoflight levels. This ensured that
unit performance was stable before many spacecraft had
begun systems tests.

System Testing
Production Process and Testing

The combination of development, qualification and
multiple production spacecraft allows a unique
approach to system-level testing. 4
Because
development and qualification vehicles were dedicated
to design verification through extensive system level
testing, testing for production vehicles focused on
finding workmanship flaws and checking performance
variations between spacecraft. Since subassemblies
andlor units underwent extensive acceptance testing,
system level workmanship tests were reduced or
eliminated for later spacecraft. This saved significant
time.

Because the overlapping development and qualification
programs were targeted at ensuring a technically-stable
design, the production process could be optimized with
an assumption of consistent behavior among the
spacecraft. Dctails of this production approach are
complex and take into account multiple factors. The
factors included the hardware deliverables from
subcontractors, the testing required and the use of
environmental test facilities, the number of qualified
personnel that the program could reasonably hire and
train, an expected increase in efficiency with each
repeated operation, the optimal number and type of test
setups, and software availability.

The initial spacecraft, including the development,
qualification, and first six flight spacecraft, experienced
a full battery of environmental tests (Table B). These
tests were to a level equal to or above those
recommended in industry standards.
For process
maturity, we determined a minimum number of
successful test runs for each type of test after which we
considered the process acceptable and repeatable, For
workmanship, we kept the most critical tests, but
reduced their extent. This only happened once the
integration personnel were completely checked out,
certified and could reliably perform the integration
tasks.
After several repeated successful runs of
environmental tests, we eliminated some of them, We
reduced thermal balance, thermal vacuum, and thermal
cycle testing.
After seven successful tests, we
eliminated system thermal testing altogether. EMI
testing was another workmanship test that we kept due
to the potential variability of the spacecraft closeouts.
However, EMI was reduced in scope from the
development and qualification tests.

Unit Deliveries

Deliveries of critical units paced the start of testing on
the first ten flight spacecraft. The program saved time
by allowing the first several flight production units on
critical boxes to go forward before qualification was
complete. An analysis of the schedule critical paths
determined the quantity of units for which this early
production was useful. In most cases, starting the
production of four units allowed the program to
maintain its aggressive schedule. In some cases, for
technically stable units, the program allowed complete
board production, population, and testing to flight
standards.
In-house components were less risky
because we had control over the prioritization of their
production or rework. Boxes from outside vendors
were more of a problem,
The two most complex units on the spacecraft, the
gateway transceiver and subscriber receiver, had
significant development problems that prevented this
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Table B: Spacecraft Test Matrix
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Functional Testing

were considerable because the repetitive nature of the
tests meant even a small individual time savings added
up. Automation also reduced the burden on the limited
number of "experts" who could effectively analyze the
data from a particular test, many of whom had other
engineering responsibilities.

Functional tests went through a similar distillation
process.
We categorized tests as either design
verification tests or performance tests. The design
verification tests included the tasks that required
validation only once on a flight or flight-like vehicle.
These tests included items such as software algorithm
verification. Performance tests are those tests that each
vehicle must undergo. These tests verify all hardware
functionality, calibrations, and critical functional tasks.
A performance test with the final flight software load
consists of two parts. Part one is the design verification
test that tests the full functionality of the software on
flight hardware. The requirement for this test is to pass
successfully a minimum of one time. Each subsequent
flight vehicle undergoes testing to verify hardware
paths, critical functions, and that it contains the correct
flight software load including calibration data.
Minimizing the functional testing on the spacecraft to
only those functions that are critical and which vary
with each vehicle saved without adding technical risk to
the program.

We also treated the first four flight spacecraft (FM3-6)
as pre-production spacecraft, and added extra time to
their schedules to refine the testing. Though a little of
this time was spent on environmental tests, the
refinement of functional tests (or limited functional tests
during environmental tests) consumed most of it. By
the fourth production unit, we had updated and refined
procedures multiple times using inputs from the
engineers and technicians actually running the
procedures.
This small planned schedule "slip"
allowed all test tearns to polish and learn the tests
before handling too many spacecraft in the test area and
eliminated a significant lingering schedule risk.
Critical Resources
The production plan also accounts for critical resources,
such as thermal vacuum chambers, vibration tables, and
the magnetic calibration facility, in the spacecraft test
flow. Personnel with certain skills and knowledge were
also critical. The use of "specialty teams" (described
below) made the most efficient use of critical test
equipment resources and skills. We also considered reordering the test flow on a select number of spacecraft
to make most efficient use of facilities. However, in

Test automation also saved time in functional testing,
though significant up-front effort was needed to refine
and automate the tests. 5 Because many different people
perform these tests multiple times on multiple
spacecraft, much of the testing was done with
automated test scripts. This increased the consistency
and accuracy of the test performance, and greatly
simplified post-test data analysis. Schedule savings
7
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practice this was not necessary. Instead, we replanned
the flow to allow the intended number of tests, but
simply changed the spacecraft assigned to certain tests.
For example, we planned thermal-vacuum testing on the
qualification spacecraft, FM3 and FM4.
When a
possible conflict for the chamber loomed, we instead
routed FM4 to thermal cycling. FM6's thermal testing
was then performed in vacuum to retain the same total
testing. With this flexibility, it was possible to use only
in-house test facilities, and avoid the time-consuming
movement of spacecraft and equipment for off-site
testing.

also did not plan the other extreme, an
approach where each person or group
small function, but did it thirty-four
compromise "specialty team approach"
best features, of the vehicle-oriented
oriented approaches.

assembly line
did only one
times.
The
combined the
and function-

Having a group of people feel as if they "own" the
spacecraft is critical. However, in order to more
efficiently use the people and their different skill sets,
we needed teams that specialized in certain activities.
The
test program uses a team that follows the
spacecraft through its production life (functional test
team), a mechanical integration team, a mechanical test
team, a thermal test team, a magnetic calibration team,
and an EMI team. The software engineers, and the other
hardware design engineers who had not transitioned
onto one of the production teams, and others augment
the test teams.

To minimize the time on critical resources, including
the functional test sets, we planned a two-shift work
day. Weekends were not planned, but used to recover
from delays. Adding a second shift was difficult
because it almost doubled the number of people needed
on the production teams. However, it also reduced the
"wear and tear" on each person-otherwise, people
worked one long shift and overtaxed themselves.

The optimum speciality team composition accounted for
the facility resources, functional test equipment, team
capacities and test durations.
Table C defines the
specialty team responsibilities and maximum capacities.
To minimize transportation costs, time, and logistical
constraints, we planned to complete all spacecraft level
testing at Orbital's Germantown, Maryland, integration
and test facility. The facility needed only minor
modifications for small spacecraft production, but its
test facilities did limit the capacity of several teams.
For example, the facility has only one vibration shaker
capable of the required levels which requires vibration
testing to occur serially.
The largest facility
modification was the addition of a magnetics test
chamber which also limits capacity to one spacecraft at
a time. In contrast, the integration and thermal tearns
were limited by the number of trained personnel who
could adequately perform the required tasks. The
functional teams were limited by the number of test sets
available to them for testing. Initially, we tried to
minimize the number of expensive test sets, but, relaxed
this limitation when it became apparent that the time
savings outweighed the additional costs.

Because the same people perform tasks multiple times,
we assumed an improvement in their performance and
adopted a 90% learning curve on the parts of activities
(Fixed duration
that were not fixed in duration.
activities included such things as the dwell time and
number of thermal cycles, or the time to send enough
bits for reliable communications tests.) The ability to
reduce test duration obviously saves valuable time but
also reduces resource conflicts, which is a more
significant benefit. If a particular task, e.g. vibration
testing, takes only a day, then we are much more likely
to get the test run on two spacecraft in a week using a
single shaker than if each test takes two days.
Specialty Team Approach

The most critical resource was qualified and trained
personnel.
As the development and qualification
programs progressed, we modified the original concept
of having one team take a spacecraft through all of the
test flow. It simply was not efficient enough in the use
of each person and their particular skills. However, we
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Table C: Specialty Team Capabilities

Integration

Vibration
and
Deployment

Thermal

Magnetics

EMC

Functional

Initial Box Installations
Post Functional Test Installations (Solar Arrays, Antennas ... )
Packing, Shipping & Storage
Mass Prrn'lP,rti
Vibration test station set-up
Vibration testing
Data collection and reduction
Deployment testing
Post test verification
Thermal test preparations (thermal couple installation, data
acquisition, & blanket installation)
Thermal Vacuum Tests
Thermal Cycle Tests
Functional
Magnetics chamber preparation and maintenance
Magnetics testing
Compensating magnetic installation
Data
.
and review
EMI facility coordination
EMI test tool automation
EMI Testing
Data
and review
Spacecraft 'owners'; vehicle engineers
Functional test automation
Pre-environmental functional testing
Environmental limited functional testing
Post environmental functional testing
verification

Four spacecraft in parallel

Serial test (one spacecraft at a time)

Thermal Vacuum - Serial test (one
spacecraft at a time)
Thermal Cycle - Two spacecraft
can be tested in parallel
Serial test (one spacecraft at a time)

Serial test (one spacecraft at a time)

Five teams
Each team can functionally test one
spacecraft at a time

launches the pacing item was the loading of the
functional test teams. A loading histogram for one of
the functional test teams is shown in Figure 3.

Using the defined team capacItIes and realistic
integration and test durations, team work load was
analyzed using Microsoft® Project. For early launches
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Figure 5

The spacecraft functional test team ran multiple tests
and acted as the spacecraft "owner." Led by the
vehicle engineer, they were responsible for getting their
assigned spacecraft through the test sequence. Each of
the five functional test teams was familiar with the
"personality" and quirks associated with particular
spacecraft.

spacecraft went back to the functional test team for a
minor checkout.
Next was the magnetic calibration test. The mechanical
integration team then stepped in to complete final closeouts, which included sunshield and thermal blanket final
installations, and closing up any holes to maintain the
RF integrity of the spacecraft. Early spacecraft went
through mass properties measurements at this point;
later spacecraft only had stowed mass and c.g. measured
before shipment. The EMI test followed the completion
of the final spacecraft close-outs (Figure 4). After EMI
checkout, the spacecraft then went to storage, either to
await shipment to the launch site, or to await a final
software load and functional test before shipping to the
launch site.

The mechanical integration team was the least loaded
(Figure 5) and the first team to handle the spacecraft.
They installed all the units and handed the spacecraft
off to the functional test team to complete extensive
performance tests.
Initial functional tests
were
designed to verify the spacecraft is safe to 'power up'.
Once complete, each subsystem was thoroughly
checked out to verify proper operation and
performance.
After initial functional testing was complete, the
mechanical test team took over to vibrate the spacecraft.
After vibration, the mechanical test team checked out
all the deployments, solar array and antenna. Then they
passed the spacecraft back to the functional test team
for post-vibration electrical functional testing.

The challenge for each team was to better their
efficiency with each operation.
This created an
atmosphere where each team was highly motivated to
improve its performance. With each repetition, the
specialized teams improved the efficiency of their task.
At the same time a group of people remained whose
focus was to get a particular spacecraft out the door.

Next, the thermal test team prepared the spacecraft for
thermal testing. Thermal testing would normally be
around-the-clock operations and the functional team
helped where necessary. After thermal testing the

With a combination of spacecraft "owners" and
specialty task teams, the ORBCOMM program was able
to select the optimum characteristics from both
11
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•
approaches. We kept the efficiency of an assembly line
production system. At the same time, with the concept
of a team owning each spacecraft, we kept the energy,
enthusiasm, and positive motivation that comes with
having total responsibility for a major task.

problems, and then was delayed multiple times
following the antenna deployment failures. However,
we planned the system production so that antennas were
not required until the last environmental test (EMI) .
While less 'extreme, other units drifted in their
production schedules until they were nearly critical-path
items. None ultimately became critical, but did distract
management attention and production capacity that
would have been better spent on system and critical
issues. Unit production did not achieve a solid margin
to system production needs until the second plane of
eight spacecraft.

Progress
Despite obstacles, implementation of this manufacturing
approach is proceeding smoothly. Production started
slowly as unit deliveries ramped up and the system test
procedures matured. However, the testing stabilized
and gained speed as the well-behaved hardware allowed
the teams to focus on other problems. As of late July,
four spacecraft have completed environmental testing
and ten others are in various stages of system
integration and testing. Spacecraft have moved through
production at rates of nearly one per week. The
spacecraft have experienced few technical problems,
but even the modest rework on multiple spacecraft was
particularly burdensome.

Maturity of Functional Testing
Functional tests on the qualification and flight
spacecraft began before all the development work was
complete. This caused several key people, who had
dual roles in development and testing, to be
overbooked.
In cases where their development
responsibilities included the test tools, this further
delayed the maturation of the tools. This in turn slowed
the testing, placing even greater demands on their time.

Unit Delivery
As discussed above, the delivery of critical RF units
limited the ability to start spacecraft into testing. In
addition to the direct delay, this had another effect: noncritical units slipped schedule because of the perception
they were not "needed". One example is the cold-gas
reaction control system (RCS). Parts for production
systems were in inventory for eight months, but only the
EDU and qualification assemblies were produced. This
was due to other demands on the technicians qualified
to weld the units, and the perception that it was less
critical than other tasks because of the slack time
available. Once the systems began production, a series
of technical problems with the valves forced repeated
rework and re-testing. The first ten RCSs nearly
delayed system production before the RCS fabrication
and test effort recovered.

Additional
delays
resulted
from
insufficient
configuration management of test tools, and problems
with GSE hardware slowed early system testing. While
our flight software configuration control was excellent,
the test software did not fare so well. Each type of tool
(OASIS scripts, LabView programs, modem control
software) was managed differently.
Some even
straddled the Unix and PClWindows environments. A
series of server and network overhauls, development of
Unix scripts to synchronize the multiple test stations
with a master one, and experience with the limitations
of the tools and management process eventually
overcame these difficulties.
Electrical ground support equipment also resisted our
attempts to control it.
The modems used to
communicate with the spacecraft varied in performance
from one unit to the next. While this was acceptable for
straight communications, bit error rate tests frequently
became an exercise in verifying modem performance
rather than the spacecraft's implementation loss! We
finally tested all the modems ourselves and returned
several to the vendor. The test teams also learned how
to spot a balky modem, and therefore wasted less time
on GSE problems.
However, GSE integration,
problems, and maintenance continue to consume far
more effort than anticipated.

The antenna assemblies presented particularly thorny
production issues. These assemblies included parts
from three vendors, special-material circuit boards, and
many small manufactured parts. The structural boom
pieces and elements required preparation before
integration; the circuit boards required tuning with the
elements. In addition, the magnetometer on the boom
was matched to a particular attitude control electronics,
and the boom was match-drilled and aligned to
particular structure .. Thus we have a complex electrical
and mechanical assembly, subject to RF (antenna range)
testing, that cannot be easily interchanged in spacecraft
production.
Unfortunately, production of antenna
assemblies lagged badly due to initial RF performance

With the increasing maturity of the test process and
GSE, functional testing began to be quite predictable12
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the measured unit performance "showed through" to the
system level. However, most ORBCOMM engineers
troubleshoot a problem starting with the GSE software,
moving to the GSE, then finally the flight hardware, and
lastly the flight software. This is exactly the reverse of
most programs!

vendor for repairs.
Other anomalies which had
significant impact to production were those requiring
retrofitting onto all vehicles. An example was the
antenna deployment failure on FM3. After extensive
troubleshooting, the failure mechanism was twofold
improper stowage and surface treatment in the trough.
The improper stowage was corrected by better training
of technicians and adding more explicit steps in the
written proceedure. The more difficult corrective action
was rework to the trough walls and base, which had to
be done on all vehicles. Since the trough is an integral
part of the satellite and provides EMI protection it is
difficult to replace. Furthermore, the long lead time of
the new surface delayed even the start of this rework by
a few weeks.
Several other anomalies and their
associated impact are discussed in Table D.

Test Anomalies
In all cases, test anomalies affected the day to day
schedule and required work-arounds to maintain the
launch dates. In some cases, the impact was minimal
due to the ability to remove a component and replace it
with one slated for a later spacecraft. An example of
this was a solar array drive which was inadvertently
driven to its hardware stops, potentially damaging the
unit. The recovery was simple: replace the unit with a
later unit in stock and send the damaged unit back to the

Table D: Production Spacecraft Anomalies

FM6
Antenna deployment failure

FM3, also affected qual and
FM9

Umbilical connector mating
issues due to out-of-round
connectors
Passive intermodulation

FM7,8, 10, 11 and severa]
completed harness
assemblies.
All antenna assemblies. Fix
probably effective on
FM13+
FM7

Flight computer

Test Activity Learning Curves

Modest - Replaced oscillator, wiring, and power unit.
Power unit later reworked.
Extensive Required intrusive rework on all inprocess and future spacecraft and delayed antenna
fabrication
Minimal - Separate subassemblies incorporating the
connectors were replace on a non-interference basis
Modest - Required a waiver for initial spacecraft and
rework to future spacecraft
Minimal - Replaced unit and troubleshot/repaired
defective unit off-line.

specialty teams testing their higher-priority earlier
spacecraft (FM3&5).

All speciality teams demonstrated learning curves better
than those originally planned (Figures 6-11). Electrical
functional testing varied more in duration than
environmental testing. This was primarily caused by
units that became available late, a greater likelihood of
uncovering anomalies in functional tests, and
immaturity of the automated test tools.

The development of ORBCOMM's communication
system automated test tools affected early spacecraft
test durations. Each functional team needed to become
trained on these test tools and the spacecraft
communications system operation. These effects also
rippled into the environmental tests which required
communications testing, such as thermal cycle/vacuum
and EMI testing. It took approximately five spacecraft,
one for each team, to iron out the test tools and for the
teams to become proficient in their use. Once complete,

Bus testing was extended on FM8 & 10 because the full
compliment of boxes were not available. In addition,
the functional teams were diverted to support the other
13
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To overcome this constraint, handling fixtures were
developed and modified during the testing. The new
fixtures allow spacecraft to be transported into the
chamber in minutes. The reduction in thermal cycle test
time from six to two days resulted primarily from more
efficient electrical functional bus and communication
test tools.
The initial thermal tests expended
considerable time troubleshooting the test scripts. All
test incidents were traced back to the test scripts; no
spacecraft anomalies occurred in any of the thermal
tests. By the final thermal tests the test tools were
mature and ran smoothly.

the tests were extremely reliable and the durations
predictable.
The steepest learning curves occurred in the vibration
testing, magnetic calibration, and thermal cycle/vacuum
testing. Vibration testing decreased from four days to a
minimum of one day. This resulted from more efficient
spacecraft handling, improved shaker control, quicker
spacecraft installation and optimized staffing levels.
Magnetics testing requires that the spacecraft be
removed and installed into the chamber numerous
times. Testing is very sensitive to local movement of
ferrous material; therefore, use of an overhead or
mobile crane to install the spacecraft is unacceptable.
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manager.
These steps collectively alleviated the
pressure on the mechanical team. This is also a case
where multiple-shift work did not help-there were
plenty of spacecraft and mechanical tasks to do at any
time, so total person-hours available was the constraint,
not hours on a spacecraft in a day.

Actual Production Constraints
With the individual test activities running so well, the
limiting factor on the overall spacecraft flow has
become handoffs between activities, mechanical
operations, and major software releases. Most of the
transitions between work cells involve changes in
spacecraft location or integrated state (such as adding
blankets for thermal-vacuum or the antenna for EMI
testing). Therefore, these handoffs are really another
case of mechanical operations. Major mechanical
operations, such as initial integration and preparation
for vibration, were scheduled explicitly. However, the
mechanical operations team was also caught up in the
frequent movement of spacecraft, and the many minor
changes in state that occurred throughout the flow. This
taxed their limited staff. Top priority activities in a
given week, and many second-priority operations,
happened as scheduled. However, rework (especially
on the antennas), staffing shortages, and minor GSE or
design issues kept all the spacecraft mechanical
Initial
operations from happening as desired.
integration lagged, but did not become critical.
However, spacecraft frequently waited for an activity
because they needed minor mechanical work.

Functional test teams have been less busy than
anticipated. However, four spacecraft are currently
awaiting their final functional tests, and more should be
ready in the next week or two. These final tests cannot
begin until the release of "Checkpoint 8" software,
which is quite close to the final flight version. The
software is actually in excellent shape, but the added
features force significant revisions to the test scripts,
process, and training. Bringing all these clements
together on a new release to five test stations will
certainly cause some difficulties! To minimize this
problem, the software and all aspects of the test scripts
and procedures have been run repeatedly on the flatsats,
EDU, and qualification spacecraft.
We also use
spacecraft engineers and technicians who are not too
familiar with the particular tests to make the dry runs.
This approach should minimize the production area
disruption of the last major software revision.

These operations became smoother with the addition of
several experienced technicians. Simultaneously, the
amount of rework declined: We also augmented the
team by using additional technicians from the harness
and unit assembly areas to do the initial spacecraft
integration, under the supervision of a different
17
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Conclusions
on Small Satellites, Logan, Utah, September,
1996.

The refined procedures and few environmental
problems allowed later spacecraft to progress rapidly.
Eighteen spacecraft are planned for delivery to the
launch site this year, with the balance well into
production. The overlap of development, qualification.
and production and the arrangement of specialty teams
we used have proven successful. Despite other assets
and a qualification program, the production process has
benefited from treating the first four flight vehicles as
pre-production units, and using them to help stabilize
the process. Future production programs would gain
from more rigorous control of test sets and test software
configuration, earlier development of testing procedures
and software, and additional mechanical support to
cover the many small activities the spacecraft undergo.
However, the ORBCOMM project has clearly proven
that production quantities of sophisticated small
spacecraft can be built in a short time at low cost.

5. Lewin, A.W., Streamlining Satellite Development,
Testing, and Operations Using A Cots
th
Command and Telemetry Package, 10
AIAAlUSU Conference on Small Satellites,
Logan, Utah, September, 1996.
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